ther investigation. In order to accurately analyze the details of Chinese feminist literary research, I surveyed all the articles related to purely Western feminist literary theories in Wenyi lilun (文藝理論Literary and Artistic Theories) during the 1990s 7 . I chose this journal because of its academic prestige, which the fact that almost every prestigious American university's Asian library has this journal could prove. Another proof of its academic prestige was perhaps related to its early establishment and being an academic survival of the harsh Cultural Revolution. It was established in 1973 -around three years before the Great Cultural Revolution was over-. This journal's fortitude and longevity even after all kinds of serious hurts at the end of the Great Cultural Revolution highly deserved academic respect. The other reason to select this journal 8 was because of its location in Beijing: the capital of China, and the most qualified representative of the whole nation. In addition, Wenyi lilun accepted articles addressing Western literary and artistic thoughts. Authors of journal articles in Wenyi lilun were located almost all over the whole communist China in the 1990s 9 .
A GREETING TO THE WEST
In the 1990s, Chinese research on Western feminist literary theories contained at least three characteristics: first, a greeting to the West; second, a socio-political avoidance of practical feminist activism and women's radical social movements; and third, a French theoretical orientation after most AngloAmerican feminist thoughts were already introduced to pre-1990 China (see appendix).
around the end of the 19 th century and the beginning of the 20 th century. It was questionable that whether male modernizers in East Asia were one-hundred-percent sincere and honest feminists. However, a lot of earliest East Asian feminist publications did not suffer from American earliest feminist writers' tragic destiny of being kicked out of the prestigious journals. The initial feminist publications in China were no exception among almost all the early East Asian feminist publications. The earliest Chinese feminist publications might not be very mature feminist theoretical publications. But they were basic feminist notions published in major magazines, newspapers, or books. 7. I would focus upon articles purely on Western feminist theories, neither feminist textual criticism nor other topics. Take Wenyi lilun of the 1991 for instance. There were entirely around 382 articles. Among them, there were approximately 103 pieces about Marxism, socialism, Leninism, Maoism as well as the CCP propaganda about literary thoughts. There were around thirty papers on comparative literature. As for articles about non-feminist literary theories and textual criticism, such as narratology, realism, rhetoric, aesthetics, and so on, there were more than one hundred and ninety articles. Forty-seven papers were about Chinese literary thoughts and textual criticism. Two articles were about Taiwanese literature, and two pieces were feminist textual criticism. 8. Its founder was renmin daxue xubao ziliao she (人民大學書報資料社Data Center of Publications and News at Renmin University). 9. Other journals, such as Waiguo wenxue (外國文學Foreign Literature) Chinese theorists' access to Western feminist theories might be a reflection of the government's «Open Door Policy» toward the West. Roughly, after the middle of the 1980s, China transferred feminist theories from the West -mainly Anglo-American feminist notions-. One of the initial systematic transfers of Western feminism in Chinese literary academia began in the late 1980s, especially in 1989. Zhu Hong (朱虹) and others started to summarize, outline, and apply feminist thoughts that were inside of Western feminist scholars' publications, such as Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex. Most of them focused solely on primary literary texts instead of ontological or epistemological discourses. Beijing University started to offer the first class about Western feminist literary criticism around that period of time. Later in the early 1990s, the Chinese publisher, henan renmin (河南人民出版社), issued one of the most well accepted Chinese digests of feminist discourses, Meng Yue (孟悅) and Dai Jinhua's (戴錦華) Fuchu lishi dibiao (浮出歷史地表Voices Emerging Into The Foreground of History: A Study of Contemporary Chinese Women's Literature).
Politically speaking, this appropriation more or less coincidentally matched the People's Republic of China's strong governmental motivation to re-establish the PRC's positive relationship with the West. Although the Tiananman Square Incident (天安門事件) in June 1989 10 indirectly decreased the Western world's friendship with the PRC, Chinese communism insisted on an «Open Door Policy» in terms of diplomatic relationships 11 . What the West was in their mind referred to Euro-American advanced countries, which the US represented.
In brief, Communist China opened herself to greet the West. Hence the transplant of Western feminist theories onto China could indirectly correspond to the PRC's «Open Door Policy» toward the West. Judging from the fact that those who began transplanting Western feminism were safe and sound, the transplantation of Western feminisms to Chinese soil was one of the first projects approved by the Chinese communist government. Without this approval, Western feminist theories would probably have not been transplanted into the PRC. 10 . Gorbachev's visit was the right timing to start the Tiananman Square Incident. International media's cameras were already ready in the Beijing area to record Gorbachev's visit to the whole world. They would of course not miss the Tiananman Square Incident. In other words, the Chinese communist government was impotent to veil the existence of this social movement under the pressure of international media. Otherwise, it was likely that this social movement would be silenced and mis-interpreted by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). 11. For example, in 1991 Qian Qichen (錢其琛) went to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Spain, and Greece. In the same year the PRC invited the British and Italian premiers to Beijing. Li Peng (李鵬) in 1992 visited Spain, Switzerland, Italy and Portugal. He also made a face-to-face meeting with then US president, George Bush, senior.
A Propensity to Evade Practical Feminist Activism and Women's Radical Social Movements without Communist Governmental Approval
Among articles purely on Western feminist literary theories in Wenyi lilun of the 1990s, almost all the authors adopted terminologies such as écriture féminine, deconstruction, and phallocentrism. Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva, feminist interpreters of Lacanianism, Freudianism, Derridianism, Foucultianism, and Deconstructionist theories, were also emphasized. The adoption of critical terms and their emphasis strongly indicated a preference for feminism as a theory over feminism as practice.
According to my survey of Wenyi lilun issued in Beijing (北京) in the 1990s, there were at least thirteen papers purely focusing on Western feminist thought 12 . Let me briefly mention these papers in the following paragraphs (see appendix) 13 . In «Xin shiqi nüxing zhuyi wenxue piping shuping» (新時期女性主義文學 批評述評Feminist Literary Criticism on a New Age), Lin Shuming (林樹明) defined the characteristics of feminism: a critique of phallocentrism, a quest for women's self-awakening, a re-evaluation of literary history, and an encouragement of écriture féminine. Lin Shuming (林樹明) took feminist notions, such as phallocentrism and women's writing, into consideration but failed to include feminist social movements, one of the most important parts of American feminism. In addition, Lin Shuming commented on androgygny as well as the inter-relationships among feminism, post-structuralism, Marxism, and realism. When discussing «liangxin gungti» (兩性共體 androgyny), Lin Shuming 14 pointed out the concept that some of the characteristics of écriture féminine could defeat or deconstruct masculinity. What Lin tended to underlined was in fact an ideological and epistemological repetition of chauvinism. What Lin 12 . I would like to regard these paper writers as researchers in the field of feminist and gender studies no matter whether they were men or women and no matter what field their terminal degrees were in. Men's participation in East Asian feminism was common because the beginning of almost all the East Asian feminist thoughts was not to directly fight against male-centeredness but to help male elites modernize and reform their nations. No matter in activist levels or academic aspects, East Asian feminism could seldom remove male participants or expel men. Chinese feminists were no exception. No matter whether they were truly male feminists, they did participate in Chinese academic feminism by publishing these journal articles. 13. I simply summarize these journal papers in order to show how Western feminist thought was represented in Wenyi lilun of the 1990s. My summary was not to argue out the depth of any feminist theorization. My summary aims only to facilitate my comments on these Chinese feminist theoretical appropriators' choice of French feminist theories as well as their cross-lingual and cross-cultural surviving-strategies within the socio-political trends of the 1990s. 14. Lin Shuming highlighted three key points. First, androgyny did not exclude all the differences of sexes and gender. Second, androgyny could not afford the challenge from the practical creative writing. In Lin's opinion, what to write or how to write could not be factors to make sure whether or not a literary work was a piece of écriture féminine. Nor could the first person narration, which was frequently adopted by woman writers, be the reason why a work belonged to écriture féminine. Third, androgyny could not be requirement for literary pieces.
Shuming 15 meant by feminism had greater influence on literary criteria than all the other philosophical theories, such as structuralism and deconstruction. Lin highlighted that feminism, since the 1970s, adopted post-structuralist critiques on the one hand and severely criticized them on the other hand. This phenomenon, to Lin, was the reason why feminism of various kinds never declined when post-structuralism faded away gradually.
Zhang 22 analyzed overseas Chinese woman writers. The cultural diversity, the dynamic diaspora, and the marginal-ness of these overseas writers, for both Rao and Chen, were what could radically subvert the patriarchal self-centered-ness.
Wen Jiehua (文潔華) and Li Jikai (李繼凱) explored different gender factors that were related to literary originality and evaluation. Li Jikai (李繼凱) 23 clarified the interrelationships among sexology, literature and arts. Sexology, to Li, was not just literary themes but also the motivation and the originality of literary writings . Wen Jiehua (文潔華) 24 thought that Western feminist aesthetics pursued «negative aesthetics,» which was in contrast to the phallocentric binary logic. A quest for authentic femininity was the key to the post-patriarchal art, which should be close to daily life, culture, and nature with no fixed outer 134). Zhou stressed the political strategies for the authentic femininity to subvert the phallocentric convention: a mimesis of the male subjectivity as an intervention from the margin toward the center, and an androgyny as an ideal to combine both the masculinity and the femininity. 20. Liu forms. The so-called «genius» and «sublimity» that the traditions affirmed were never highly honored. Besides, feminist art was not necessarily women's art. Compared with the above-mentioned Chinese journal articles, Western feminist theorists' scope was interdisciplinary, including fields such as sociology, anthropology, history, ethnology, politics, legislation, and law. In this Chinese journal of the 1990s, only French feminist theories of Luce Irigaray's, Julia Kristeva's, and Hélène Cixous's seemed to be especially highlighted. In Wenyi lilun of the 1990s, this Chinese cross-lingual and cross-cultural preference for the three dominant French feminist theorists indicated not merely the theoretical content of the French feminist writings as an object of academic worship 25 . It also implied these French feminists' non-activist career backgrounds -namely, career backgrounds of literature, linguistics, philosophy or psychology-. In other words, these French feminist scholars were farther away from practical social movements, such as political petitions, radical parades, reforms of legislation, fights against governmental patriarchy and so on.
In addition to a larger scope covering various fields, feminisms, particularly in the US, had one more facet and that was activism. Typical of the US feminist perspective, Susan Ehrlich used her critical linguistic methodology to investigate a case of sexual harassment on the campus of York University
26
. Not only her feminist concepts were simply written but they were also practically applied to courtroom litigation. Also, Mary Koss, a researcher studying rape and sexual harassment on campus, conducted a practical investigation of college-age women students' reactions to issues such as rape and sexual violation at Kent University 27 . In Wenyi lilun of the 1990s, Chinese scholars' love for French theories lied not just in the theoretical content of their writings but also in their non-practical career backgrounds of literature, linguistics, philosophy or psychology. The love for non-practicality implied the communist governmental oppression of social movements or activism organized by citizens themselves. Many contemporary American feminist theorists, though not all American feminists, had diverse career backgrounds that enabled them to practically deal with the cases that inspired feminist theories. For instance, feminist theorist Catharine MacKinnon was a lawyer before she taught in law school as both a law professor and a feminist. Not only did her previous career background enable her to address sexual problems in daily life with an attorney's professional ability and knowledge, but her academic work showed her awareness of the importance of practicality 28 . In addition, the interdisciplinarity that Western women's and gender studies emphasized strongly indicated the diversity of Western gender researchers' backgrounds. For instance, a feminist scholar in the West, though probably not having any other job outside of campus, might be an anthropologist, a sociologist, an activist and so on at the same time. Few of the Chinese theorists, whose articles I surveyed, applied feminism to activist practice or women's radical social movements. Fulian (婦聯All-China Women's Federation) even exposed a horrifyingly ugly fact that a huge number of recent campus sexual harassment and sexual violation resulted from schoolteachers who lacked psychological balance and hurt female students 30 .
A FRENCH INFLUENCE
Generally speaking, China's appropriation of Western feminist concepts in this journal of the 1990s tended to draw from French feminists rather than their American counterparts. This Sino-West feminist selective filtering occurred during cultural transfers. Chinese theoretical appropriators took what they found the most useful and dropped what they were less able to acculturate in their local environments. Let me roughly sketch some well-known American feminist thought that Chinese scholars failed to put equal emphasis on in their transfer of Western feminisms into this Chinese journal in the 1990s.
I would briefly enlist some American psychodynamics of marriage and family structures as examples. Gayle Rubin pointed out that women were exchanged as if they were commodities among men through marriages in patriarchal societies 31 . Nancy Chodorow re-interpreted women's desire to reconstruct the psychological triangular relationships among mother, father, constructed and managed discourse. She pointed out that men's domination of discourse trapped women by fictitious «truths» that men produced and controlled. Rowbotham noticed the double oppression that working-class women tolerated. According to Adrienne Rich, women might share a rich history and culture of the «woman-identified-woman» tradition through a «lesbian continuum». In brief, in terms of sexual orientation, social class struggles, racial and ethnic self-identity and so on, feminist concerns in the US were much more diversified than the gender issues Chinese scholars showed in the above-mentioned journal papers in the 1990s.
But how and why did the One of the other most apparent distinctions between French feminism and American feminism was that American feminism included a concern with practic1al and radical feminist social movements. Take the discussion about motherhood and maternity for instance; French feminists and American feminists worked from extremely different directions even when they shared the same focus on the mother figure. French feminists were eloquent theoretically and philosophically. But without any governmental influence, American feminists concretely put abstract thoughts and ideology into practice. This was exactly the practical and radical part of US feminist activism. Efforts made by other American feminist organizations to make a better contribution to women's welfare might be illustrated by the following: in the US, the combination of both theories and social activism yielded the establishment of organizations such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) founded by Betty Friedan in 1966. Another important American feminist organization was Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) that aimed to achieve equal treatment for women in terms of laws, tax, education, and employment. The National Council of Negro Women (NCNW) was a non-profit membership organization dedicated to improving the lives of African-American women. The National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NCASA) supported sexually mistreated women.
In addition, third wave feminists managed movements that tried to «unite women across ethnic, racial, and whenever possible, class divisions …[A]ctivists have organized workshops» to practically promote a greater transnational and cross-cultural sisterhood among women from various races, classes, religions, socio-political backgrounds, sexual orientations and so on 41 . French feminist theorists did not emphasized this practical application of theories. Chinese scholars, like French feminists in this sense, barely included feminist social movements.
American feminist scholarship, which was very much connected with practical activism, emerged and matured in the context of its very strong grass-rooted political movement. It was buoyed, confirmed and reinforced by its connection to the experiences and ideas of the multitude of women who participated in the feminist movement in one way or another. In many ways, American feminism spoke of, and to, various American women: white women, black women, Native American women, middle-class women, women proletarians, women im- , women of color and so on. French Feminism of the 1990s was largely theoretical in its genesis and in its constitution. It flourished in the abstract disciplines -primarily philosophy and psychoanalysis-. It did not rely on empirical research; it did not generally connect up with concrete social issues and problems -for example, workplace discrimination or sexual harassment-. It did not concern itself with a concrete political program. That is to say, French Feminism did not have, and in many ways did not need the support of a social group or a popular constituency -it was academic in the traditional sense-representing and appealing to the perspective of an academic elite, and dealing with problems that were largely «academic» -meaning removed from everyday, practical problems-. In contrast, American feminism was shaped by its connections to a «mass» women's constituency.
A FEAR FOR THE CONSEQUENCE OF RADICAL ACTIVISM: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND CENSORSHIP IN THE VELVET PRISON
Although Chinese journal articles I surveyed included not merely feminist literary theories but also other feminist theories, such as feminist psycho-42. Frankly speaking, minority, foreigners, emigrants, and immigrants were usually used and sacrificed depending upon the Chinese majority's different political needs in different eras. Around the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese minority's experiences in being oppressed were useful for the ROC to convince supporters of the need in overthrowing the Qing (清) Dynasty and then constructing a brand new nation, which would never subjugate any minority. Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), the national father of the ROC, stressed influential emigrants and foreign human resources because he depended upon them to survive from calamities in exotic areas, such as Japan and England. As for the early ROC's attention to immigrants, it was probably because Western missionaries assisted cultural reforms, such as anti-foot-biding, Western educational systems, and new medical networks. In addition, immigrants' financial backgrounds helped Chinese folks modernize banks, universities, hospitals, etc. At the early ruling stage of the PRC, Chinese minority was used to celebrate the cultural space for racial multiplicity within the overall communist union (CHEUNG, Siu-Woo: «Subject and Representation: Identity Politics in Southeast Guizhou», PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1996, pp. 182-281). However, when they were no longer so useful and so necessary in terms of governmental and political benefits, they were often disregarded. For instance, «from the Anti-Rightist Campaign through the Cultural Revolution, [the original communist] policy of protecting heterogeneity was dramatically reversed…a more uniform socialist culture was …to supersede the local differences» (SCHEIN, Louisa: «Gender and Internal Orientalism in China», in Susan Brownell and Jefferey N. Wasserstrom (eds.): Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002, p. 387). Later on in the 1980s and 1990s, the minority was more differentiated. For instance, women in aboriginal tribes turned out to be a part of the representatives of minority cultures in China. Unfortunately, the minority was habitually eroticized, (self-)objectified, pointed out only to achieve Chinese communism's multicultural propaganda, and used as merely a tool to accomplish the national image-management (Ibíd., pp. 398-404). Whether there were truly sincere and non-political concerns about minority women, female immigrants, and women emigrants was still a riddle. I would take the Tibetan women's association for example in the middle part of this article.
analysis, the topics or aspects that these papers cover were limited compared with the above mentioned ones. For instance, racial or multicultural issues of feminist studies were seldom mentioned in Chinese articles. That is to say, the feminisms transferred through these papers into China did not include all that the original Western theorists cover. Chinese feminist theoretical appropriators filtered, selected, and processed the original Western feminist theories as Chinese gatekeepers 43 . Thus Chinese readers about transferred Western feminist literary theories had a smaller and narrower scope than original feminist theories in the West.
Chinese researchers' preference for non-practicality, I argue, revealed their inability to practice radical feminist ideas due to the communist governmental control. Although not all Western feminists could put their theories into practice in a perfect way, Chinese feminists' lack of practicality was indeed one of their weaknesses. Not many of the Chinese feminist researchers could take radical and activist stances should women victims come forward at Chinese universities and approach their professors for help with sexual issues.
After a discovery of the «French flavor» that was more theoretical and contained less activism than American feminism, it was worth considering why Chinese scholars chose French feminism, especially when France was just one country in the West and could not represent the whole Western world. If the Chinese governmental policy was to greet the West, or to open China's door to the West, then why did Chinese feminist researchers embrace France more closely and opened their door to French theorists more enthusiastically than others according to what Wenyi lilun of the 1990s disclosed? Why were they afraid of or inclined to dislike American feminism?
The Chinese preference for non-practicality was clear in Wenyi lilun of the 1990s, and it was puzzling why the aspect of practicality seemed to be so deliberately omitted. If the ability to deal with the practical aspects of social feminism, such as organizing a national women's association and planning demonstrations for the right of abortion, would be helpful for Chinese women, then why did these Chinese feminist appropriators not develop practical organizations and feminist social movements?
Why did Chinese scholars avoid connection with social movements? Why was the consequence of the feminist social movement so intimidating to communist China? In order to find out possible answers to these questions, a brief probe into the Chinese socio-political world would be necessary. The following discussion will explore the social backgrounds and political consequences of social movements and feminist organizations in China that might influence women's and gender studies in China of the 1990s.
From 1965 to 1976, the Chinese Cultural Revolution restricted PRC's contacts with foreign academics. Well-educated elites in Chinese academies suf-fered during numerous communist political power struggles. Some of them were xiafang laogai (下放勞改sending down / reformed through labor), forced to leave their academic institutions, and then demoted to the countryside. Some of them could not tolerate the physical and spiritual torture they endured and died miserable deaths. Well-educated elites with knowledge of either international or Western -to be more specific, American-advanced research faced the most threat of danger.
The . In other words, the Chinese communist authorities demonstrated that participation in non-approved social movements might cause disastrous results: either the ending was to die miserably, to be put in jail, to be expatriated, or to seek asylum in foreign countries. Even though freedom of speech and academic freedom were already taken for granted in the West's contemporary era, intellectuals' thoughts in China were still censored by the CCP .
«The slaughterers, the soldiers of the 27th army, used tanks, assault weapons, and bayonets (… ) on people who (…) yelled only a lone slogan (…). They used automatic guns to mow them down so that the chests of all of the dead were soaked in blood (…).Their hands, chests, and legs were covered with blood» 47 .
Some comments said that the situation was even worse than the Cultural Revolution. A witness, after catching sight of the bloody scenes, expressed the concern that «China [is] sinking … into the … warlordism, fascism» 48 . If the above-mentioned terror was the tragic result of social movements that attempted to influence Chinese society towards democracy and indirectly challenge government authority, then it might be understandable that Chinese feminists dared not directly become committed to social movements outside 44 Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1989, p. 175. of communist governmental levels. Even at the United Nations' conference on women in Beijing in 1995, what was said about feminist thoughts in that conference by Chinese speakers was said with the communist governmental approval. For example, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), the chairman of the CCP, ironically spoke as if he were the most qualified «teacher», «guide», «leader», or «director» of all the Chinese feminists 49 -regardless of the fact that Jiang himself was male without true experiences in any Chinese women's predicaments, and never proven to be a one-hundred-percent practical feminist in China-. This fact was a proof of how much Chinese feminist activism was under the CCP's political control and «guidance» in the 1990s. Whatever the CCP politically disapproved was hardly feasible in this conference. For instance, the CCP disallowed Taiwanese feminists to attend this conference as national representatives for Taiwanese women. Zheng Zhihui (鄭至慧) participated in this conference as simply an individual -not a ROC spokesperson for Taiwanese women at all-. Hence such a conference did not practically promote radical feminist activism 50 in China -though it was not exactly hurtful for Chinese feminism-. Even in the post-Maoist era that was more liberal, «women [were] dependent on society, on the party, and on the state…women [were] doomed by their passive role» 51 . If social movements in the PRC were too dangerous for Chinese researchers in the field of gender studies, then was it safe for Chinese feminist appropriators to manage their own feminist organizations? If larger strikes in social movements were too dangerous, then were women's parades for some milder issues safer?
In the last decade before the new millennium, no major incidents occurred in which people were killed by the CCP because of their political or religious beliefs. Governmental permission still played an extremely influential role in the sanctioning and domination of intellectuals' academic projects. Take the Tibetan Women's Association for instance 52 . It was probably one of the rarely seen Chinese radical women's social movements that were not controlled by communist governmental powers 53 . The location of its website was in Canada, however. The location of the association was in India. . All of the demonstrations were non-violent, involving less than half a dozen people and lasting less than five minutes. They become known collectively as the Drapchi 14. It was unlikely that Tibet women's organizations were approved of and welcomed by the Chinese communist government. And the cases in other areas of China were probably similar or not better than the Tibet situation 55 .
Even fulian (婦聯All-China Women's Alliance), which was founded under the support of the central administrative system, seemed to be obedient to the communist government 56 . Chinese feminist scholars might have seen fulian's governmental practice in action, such as «One Child Policy», and hence might not want to go that direction at all. Fulian did not seem to strive for women in aspects that were outside of the communist governmental concern about women. For instance, in the 1990s most Chinese women victims, if suffering rape, marital abuse, or sexual violation, still had no place to turn to 57 . Unlike
In Communist China, small women's organizations, such as funü chuanmei jiance wangluo (Women's Media Watch Network) or Shaanxi funü lilun hunyin jiating yanjiuhui (Shaanxi Association for Women and Family), regarded themselves as non-profit organizations without formal support from the central government of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, they were still much less influential than fulian in the 1990s. Some researchers wondered whether they «display[ed] the same rigid notion of political correctness… in negotiations» (HSIUNG, PingChun; JASCHOK, Maria; MILWERTZ, Cecilia and CHAN, Red: Chinese Women Organizing, Oxford & New York, Berg, 2001, pp. 11, 193-226) . These small women's organizations in Communist China seldom called any radical strikes or parades on streets. Some of the members in these organizations confessed to me that it would be impossible for CCP to allow radical feminist social movements without governmental permission. 54. Drapchi Prison was notorious for its poor living conditions. Torture and ill-treatment by prison officials are commonplace. Political prisoners are often beaten severely and shocked with electric cattle prods. Nuns and other female prisoners have reportedly been raped. In Tibet, the current Chinese communist government was conducting a ruthless crackdown on any form of political dissent. Tibetan politics and religion are very closely linked, so the focus of this crackdown had been on monks and nuns of the Buddhist faith. Also It was still questionable whether they gave raped or abused women any 24-hour shelter, protec-American female victims assisted by organizations such as rape crisis centers, current Chinese women seldom had any specialists' legal representation or psychological counseling service from their own women's institutions. In other words, the Chinese feminist appropriators, whose journal articles I surveyed, might not feel comfortable and safe in their socio-political surroundings in terms of their own formal feminist organizations and social movements in China of the 1990s. An evident illustration was Ling Ding's (丁玲) complaint about women's double burden in private family life and public job markets in an essay entitled «Sangajie you gan» (三八節有感 «Thoughts» on March 8, 1942) 58 . Two months after her critique was published, Ding was forced to «confess her 'errors' at a communist mass meeting 59 . This experience of Ding's might be too ancient to be directly lumped with my argument about the 1990s. However, such an incident happened before vigorous nation-wide communist power struggles -not to mention the worst era from the 1950s to the 1970s-. Although the milder post-Maoist era allowed feminist scholars, such as Li Xiaojiang (李小江), to complain about Chinese women's double burdens in academic publications, there was still never any radical feminist activism of Chinese women's own to fight against either the communist patriarchy or the governmental male-centered-ness in the 1990s.
One of the subtlest proves in the 1980s and the 1990s was probably how and where feminist scholars published their complaints about the CCP's insincerity. Some feminist Asianists, such as Emily Honig, criticized that women's liberation was never a main central concern for the CCP . Almost all of these feminist protests against the CCP were written in or translated into English and then published outside of the territory that the CCP could dominate. These scholars' avoidance of writing their grievance in Mandarin Chinese and publishing their dissatisfactions in China was a clear illustration of how much they were afraid of the Chinese communist political power.
Even in the 1990s, there was still censorship in China repressing freedom of thought and speech more vigorously than the previous authoritative regime during the Cultural Revolution. Geremie Barmé, in an article entitled, «The tive order, or sessions of psychological counseling twice a week exactly in the same way that Western feminist activists often supplied to victims in the 1990s People's Daily was repeatedly explored by a number of researchers as one of the best proofs of censorship.
«One student from the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute called for the removal of press censorship and pointed out that it was the strongest demand of the students that the press should «tell the truth» (…) Mu Yuan [the spokesman of the State 62. BARMÉ, Geremie: «The Greying of Chinese Culture», China Review, 13:2 (1992) , Hong Kong, p. 2.
Geremie Barmé commented on the leader cults continually promoted by the party propaganda machine in the 1980s and 1990s in the following terms: «While the Party promoted the great revolutionaries of the past to confirm its present authority, the masses often responded to them as revived deities, bereft of immediate political and historical significance, embodying rather traditional charismatic elements: Mao Zedong, the laconic and brilliant thinker and strategist, Zhou Enlai the loyal minister who works himself to death, Jiang Qing the fickle and crazed woman, Lin Biao an evil genius and a host of other revolutionaries who made history. Compared to the gray bureaucrats of today -Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, et al.-who ' 1976-89», Issues and Studies, 25-27 (1989-91), pp. 62-63 . Owing to the specific socio-political condition, both the high-tech mass media and the press in China, right after the June Fourth student social movement «fully resumed its (…) function as the propaganda machine used by the Communist Party to rewrite history 68 -and manipulate the future-» 69 . The censorship and (self-)repression in the «velvet prison» could perhaps served as one of the possible explanations for the reason why Chinese feminist appropriators were so keenly shunning American feminist activism in the 1990s. If they did appropriate American feminist activism into China, they would probably run too much risk and pay too high a price in their lives due to socio-political environment of the «velvet prison». Under the above-mentioned circumstances and censorship, it was perhaps too demanding to expect Chinese feminist savants to establish their own feminist organizations or to plan their own feminist social movements without any concerns or worries about the communist governmental attitudes at all.
SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATED-NESS OF CHINESE FEMINISMS
In Wenyi lilun in the decade before the new millennium, Chinese theorists' enthusiasm for French feminist theorization revealed an unconscious avoidance of feminist activism and radical social movements. In other words, the PRC's governmental censorship of social movements prevented Chinese appropriators from forming social movements. Since social activism was one of the indispensable parts of American feminism, Chinese theorists' transfer of Western feminisms tended to neglect American feminist activism.
Chinese political restrictions seemed to conflict with the liberal attitude of PRC's «Open Door Policy». But as a matter of fact, no matter how much China opened herself, the PRC still had communist limitations in the 1990s. Judging from all the Chinese social movements since the 1950s, I cannot deny that all of them were politically designed or planned to serve specific governmental slogans or targets. That is to say, the CCP censored, patronized, and controlled the beginning, the development, and the termination of all these social movements. It was still politically incorrect for Chinese citizens to organize any social movements simply according to the people's own choices.
To be more specific, even with the «Open Door Policy», communist China of the 1990s was still not completely open and liberal. Hence the unconscious yet dominant intention to evade feminist social movements, which could not serve any communist ideals at all, was not irrational. This was a possible interpretation for the reason why Chinese feminist theorists either unconsciously or consciously disliked any deeper devotion to feminist social movements.
Chinese feminist theorists' dearth of any deeper devotion to radical feminist social movements was probably one of the reasons why Western feminisms in China were so different than original Western feminisms in the West. After Lydia H. Liu highlighted the necessity to rethink cross-cultural interpretation between the East and the West, I would like to rethink some possible Sino-West socio-political interpretation for China's unavoidable «change» or acculturation of Western feminisms 70 . First, Chinese political repression and lack of social liberty turned out to be the key points in how feminist and gender theories were developed and received differently in PRC. Second, a transnational and multicultural investigation into the transferal of feminist and gender theory to communist China became indispensable. In this sense, how Western feminisms looked in China was not actually how Western feminisms really were. How Western feminisms looked in China was different from how they originally looked in the West. It was, as a matter of fact, how Western feminisms were socio-politically situated in China.
Beyond a feminist comparative study of differences and similarities between Western feminists and Eastern feminists, this anthropological observation offered a possible answer to China's preference for French feminism over American activism. This probe into the repression of social movements, and the censorship in the «velvet prison» helped make sense of Chinese feminist savants' socio-political difficulties when they transferred feminisms from the West into Chinese communist territory. Under a fear for the consequence of practical activism, Chinese feminists could not but take refuge in French theorization. The way Western feminisms were socio-politically situated in China displayed the Chinese feminist scholars' necessary surviving-strategy that balanced their academic pursuits with their intellectual freedom. Such a survivingstrategy was a cross-lingual and cross-cultural one. 70. LIU, Lydia H: Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated modernity-China, 1900 -1937 , Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995 SPIVAK, Gayatri C.: In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, New York, Routledge, 1988, p. 197 .
FURTHER CROSS-LINGUAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL SURVIVING-STRATEGY
To choose French theorization in order to dodge American feminism's practical activism and social movements might be a safe action for Chinese scholars to take in the 1990s. It was truly one of the surviving-strategies in Chinese academies of the 1990s. However, there were so many French feminist theorists. It might not be possible to transfer all of them. Which ones to be chosen was an unavoidable problem. To solve the problem required further cross-lingual and cross-cultural surviving-strategies. Chinese scholars' further cross-lingual and cross-cultural surviving-strategy was to apply American/Western academia's mainstream taste onto their decisions of which French feminist theorists to transfer. Why was the American/Western academia's mainstream taste their criterion? Maybe it was because American publications in English were easier and more accessible than publications in other Western languages for most Chinese scholars. Maybe it was because USA was the strongest representative for the whole West from Chinese perspective in the 1990s.
Among all the French feminists, Chinese appropriators decided which ones they preferred to introduce to China. This Chinese literary academic journal exhibited its preference for these three French feminist theorists in the 1990s. I plan to use this as evidence. This evidence can prove that at least in the 1990s Chinese scholars filtered, decided and strategized what Western feminist theories and theorists to be localized in which ways for what reasons.
The preference for the three French feminist theorists in this journal of the 1990s was actually contrary to most Chinese scholars' Western language backgrounds. Chinese feminist scholars of the 1990s were usually more familiar with English, instead of French. Regardless of most Chinese scholars' average weakness in French language, Wenyi lilun displayed an obvious predilection for the three French feminists. Therefore, I would like to highlight Chinese crosslingual and cross-cultural impacts on the localization/sinicization of the three French feminist theorists in this specific period of time.
In terms of introductions of French feminist theories and theorists to China, theoretical appropriators' cross-cultural and cross-lingual knowledge and skill 71. Wang Zhihung (王志弘) Almost every Western theorist must have a local translator and introducer to make way into Chinese culture. Otherwise, Western thoughts would not be able to smoothly land in China without appropriate Chinese acculturation. Take Sara Kofman in China for instance. Except for the English translation of The Enigma of Women and some Chinese professors putting it into syllabi, there was almost no way for regular Chinese folks to understand Sara Kofman at all. There were not enough kind-hearted Chinese introducers to fervently propagate Sara Kofman. Most Chinese theoretical appropriators did not choose Sara Kofman. They did not have enough motivation to whole-heartedly re-phrase/ re-paraphrase Sara Kofman. Therefore, Sara Kofman was not as popular and hot as Irigaray and Cixous in Chinese feminist theoretical discussions. Without enough enthusiastic Chinese theoretical translators, appropriators, and introducers to make the way into Chinese culture, Western feminist theorists, like Kofman, could barely land smoothly in China. If I compare American academia's appropriation of Sarah Kofman, and Catherine Clément with that of Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and Hélène Cixous, everything might be much more understandable. Sarah Kofman has almost only one book translated into English. Catherine Clément's publications were also not as popular as Kristeva's. This was why the acceptance of Clément and Kofman in the US was worse than that of Irigaray, Kristeva, and Cixous. It was not because Kofman was really weaker than Irigaray. It was not because Kofman's academic importance was less than Irigaray's. It was not because Catherine Clement was truly bad, either.
On the contrary, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Julia Kristeva were ardently welcome in America not because they were better and stronger than all the other French feminists. It was because American theoretical introducers were willing to cross-culturally and cross-lingual-ly transfer these three French feminist theorists into their academic environments. Similar was the Chinese case. It was because Chinese introducers had enough motivation to transplant these three French feminists to their areas. Then, Chinese scholars indirectly applied this American/Western mainstream taste onto their reception of these three major French feminists.
When to welcome the West in order to fit in the overall Chinese foreign policy, why French feminist theories to be preferred in order to win a survival, and which French theorists to be selected in order cut down the large number of French feminists -all these were where Chinese feminist theoretical appropriators developed their cross-lingual and cross-cultural surviving-strategies within the Chinese socio-political trends of the 1990s-.
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